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[A]ttorneys shoulder a special responsibility. It is our responsibility 
to keep the doors to the courthouse open even to those who cannot 
afford to pay for counsel. For the phrase “equal justice under law” 
to be fully meaningful, it must comprise those persons who lack the 
financial resources to afford counsel. Otherwise “equal justice 
under law” will mean in effect “equal justice under law for those 
with incomes over the poverty level.” What a poor definition of 
justice!1 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized an individual’s 
fundamental right of access to the courts.2 This right of access, however, 
is not without limitation3—the courthouse doors are easily and often 
barricaded.4 Though not explicitly addressed by the Supreme Court, a 
plethora of federal district courts have enacted local rules authorizing the 
imposition of security for costs and fees.5 Even in the absence of a local 
rule, federal courts have imposed security by way of “inherent power.”6 In 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2019, by BRADLEY C. GUIN. 
 1. Frank F. Drowota, III, ‘Equal Justice Under Law’ Doesn’t Mean Only If 
You Can Afford It, 41 TENN. B.J. 26, 26 (2005). The Honorable Frank F. Drowota, 
III is a former chief justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court. Id. at 26 n.a2. 
 2. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971) (“[D]ue process 
requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding 
significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the 
judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”). 
 3. See John A. Gliedman, Access to Federal Courts and Security for Costs 
and Fees, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 953, 971 (2000) (“This right [of access to the 
courts] may be curtailed . . . upon a showing of an overriding state interest.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 4. For a brief discussion on recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence 
limiting access to justice, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 
14 GREEN BAG 2d 375 (2011) (discussing recent cases involving limitation of 
class action lawsuits, preemption, habeas corpus claims, standing, lawsuits 
against local governments, and denial of relief to victims of abuses of power). 
 5. See Gliedman, supra note 3, at 954 n.4 (listing various local rules of 
federal courts that authorize security for court costs). 
 6. See Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 535 F.2d 140, 143 (1st Cir. 
1976) (“Even in the absence of a standing local rule, a federal district court has the 
inherent power to require security for costs when warranted by the circumstances of 
the case.”). 
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addition, 41 states7—including Louisiana8—have general security for 
costs statutes, which enable defendants in civil actions to demand that the 
plaintiff9 furnish security for the costs arising from the suit in the event 
that a judgment is ultimately awarded against the plaintiff.10 In Louisiana, 
a successful motion for security poses serious implications for a plaintiff’s 
suit, resulting in a total bar to the litigation.11 Security for costs is also a 
widely recognized procedural mechanism, both domestically and 
internationally. Although a variety of jurisdictions use multifactored 
approaches,12 consider special circumstances,13 and rely on balancing 
tests14 when ruling on a motion for security for costs, Louisiana courts lack 
sufficient direction when confronted with such a motion. 
The current statutory scheme and jurisprudence governing the 
application of Louisiana’s security for court costs statute fails to provide 
                                                                                                             
 7. See Deborah A. DeMott, Security for Costs and Rules, in SHAREHOLDER 
DERIV. ACTIONS L. & PRAC. § 3:3 n.1 (2017) (listing each state and their 
respective statute(s) that authorize security for court costs). 
 8. See LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4522 (2019) (general statute authorizing security 
for court costs); see also id. § 13:1215 (specific statute authorizing security for 
costs in Orleans Parish). 
 9. Although security for costs is ordinarily sought from a plaintiff, various 
rules and statutes also authorize security from appellants or intervenors. See, e.g., 
id. § 13:4522 (authorizing a defendant to seek security for court costs from either 
a plaintiff or intervenor). 
 10. See DeMott, supra note 7, § 3.3.  
 11. See LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4522. 
 12. See, e.g., Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, reg. 194 (Can.), under 
Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (Can.); see also Hawes v. Club 
Ecuestre El Comandante, 535 F.2d 140, 144 (1st Cir. 1976): 
[W]e suggest that there are pertinent factors for the district court to 
consider, including, but not limited to ownership by a nondomiciliary 
plaintiff of attachable property in the district, the likelihood of success 
on the merits, the presence of a co-plaintiff who is domiciled in the 
district, the probable length and complexity of the litigation, the conduct 
of the litigants, and the purposes of the litigation. 
(footnotes omitted). 
 13. Irish courts consider a number of “special circumstances,” which may 
either support or defeat a motion for security for costs. See Hilary Biehler, 
Security for Costs: A Reappraisal of Established Principles, 35 DUBLIN U. L.J. 
173, 176–77 (2012) (footnotes omitted); see also discussion infra Part II.B. 
 14. See, e.g., Michele Havenga, Security for Costs in Corporate Litigation, 
15 S. AFR. MERCANTILE L.J. 354, 362 (2003) (discussing how South African 
courts use a balancing approach when ruling on a motion for security for costs); 
see discussion infra Part II.C. 
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guidance to trial courts.15 Louisiana’s security for court costs statute, 
therefore, should be amended and clarified to assist trial courts in rendering 
an equitable outcome when confronted with a motion under Louisiana 
Revised Statutes § 13:4522. Although present jurisprudence interpreting § 
13:4522 instructs trial courts on where to look when determining whether a 
defendant has shown that the plaintiff should post security for costs, the law 
remains silent as to what factors or circumstances the court should consider 
and what weight the courts should give such factors. To resolve these issues, 
this Comment provides a roadmap for Louisiana courts to follow when 
confronted with a motion for security for court costs. 
This roadmap incorporates selected aspects, theories, and standards 
from other jurisdictions—both national and international—to form a 
focused and equitable analytical framework. Because security for costs is 
widely used as a procedural mechanism throughout both American and 
international legal systems,16 reference to foreign jurisprudence and legal 
theories will assist Louisiana in refining its own system of security for 
costs. Particularly, Louisiana courts should adopt a modified version of 
the multifactored approach used by Ontario, Canada’s judiciary. Louisiana 
should also follow Irish jurisprudence and recognize special circumstances 
that either support or defeat an order for security for costs. Unlike other 
jurisdictions, however, Louisiana courts should omit an inquiry into the 
merits when ruling on a motion for security for costs, similar to the South 
African approach. Louisiana courts should also acknowledge particular 
concerns involving pro se litigants in the context of security for costs and 
aim to promulgate and share “valuable information”17 to self-represented 
litigants. Finally, a defendant should attach an itemized bill of costs to a 
security for costs motion.18 
Part I of this Comment generally reviews the background of security 
for court costs with particular emphasis on the security’s historical genesis 
in ancient Rome, its use in early English common law, and its subsequent 
American development. Part I also introduces Louisiana’s approach to 
                                                                                                             
 15. Compare LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4522, with Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
56, R.R.O. 1990, reg. 194 (Can.), under Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 
C.43 (Can.). 
 16. See Armand Schonfrucht, Costs in Litigation, 5 INT’L LEGAL PRAC. 69 
(1980) (detailing a comparative study of systems in operation in the United States, 
West Germany, France, India, and England). 
 17. See Clarkston v. Funderburk, 211 So. 3d 509, 519 (La. Ct. App. 2017) 
(Chatelain, J. concurring) (“[T]he dissemination of . . . information to the self-
represented litigant from the very inception of litigation is essential to further the 
search for justice and foster the impartiality of the trial judge.”). 
 18. See infra Appendix B. 
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security for court costs, as embodied in § 13:4522. Part II analyzes several 
jurisdictions’ approaches to the concept of security for court costs and 
introduces seminal court cases and jurisprudential theories behind the 
security. Part III proposes an analytical framework to guide Louisiana 
courts when ruling on a § 13:4522 motion. In so doing, Part III identifies 
ideal legal theories and jurisprudential standards from the jurisdictions 
analyzed in Part II and then crafts those theories and standards into a 
roadmap for Louisiana courts. This Comment concludes by introducing a 
curative piece of legislation and a model bill of costs to be attached to a 
motion for security for costs. 
I. SECURITY FOR COURT COSTS: HISTORICAL GENESIS, DEVELOPMENT, 
AND LOUISIANA’S APPROACH 
Security for costs is a powerful procedural tool.19 A plaintiff’s failure 
to post ordered security bars the progression of litigation and results in the 
suit’s dismissal.20 Yet, many practitioners often overlook this unique 
device.21 “Security for [court] costs”22 is defined as “[m]oney, property, or 
a bond given to a court by a plaintiff or an appellant to secure the payment 
of court costs if that party loses.”23 This procedural mechanism24 is 
relatively straightforward: a defendant simply files a motion to require the 
security. In turn, the security acts as a condition precedent to the plaintiff’s 
access to the court system.25 In Louisiana, security for costs can only be 
                                                                                                             
 19. Sahar Cadili, Motions for Security for Costs, ONTARIO B. ASS’N 2 (June 1, 
2015), http://www.lawrences.com/docs/default-source/publications/security-for-
costs-paper-final-pdf-(00209965).pdf [https://perma.cc/YV9W-387W]. 
 20. See LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4522. 
 21. See Cadili, supra note 19, at 2. 
 22. This Comment uses the terms “security for court costs,” “security for 
costs,” and “cost bond” interchangeably. 
 23. Security for Costs, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 24. Security for court costs is generally regarded as a procedural matter. 
Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 535 F.2d 140, 143 (1st Cir. 1976) (citing 
6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 54.73, at 1457–59 
(2d ed. 1961); 7 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 
83.03, at 1483–87 (2d ed. 1961)). But see Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 
337 U.S. 541, 556 (1949) (concluding that a New Jersey statute could not “be 
disregarded by the federal court as a mere procedural device”). 
 25. Jerel L. Ellington, The Security for Costs Requirement in California—A 
Violation of Procedural Due Process?, 6 PEPP. L. REV. 191, 191 (1978). 
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ordered from either a plaintiff or an intervenor26—never the defendant.27 
Security for court costs serves a two-fold purpose: first, the security protects 
defendants by establishing an available fund to defray costs incurred in 
defending against a claim; and second, the security discourages 
“unmeritious and frivolous” lawsuits.28 The device likewise serves a 
strategic purpose as an effective method of deterring vexatious29 litigation.30 
Since a plaintiff is required to post the security before the litigation can 
resume, security for costs forces a plaintiff to scrutinize his claim and 
seriously consider the suit’s viability.31 The practice of ordering security for 
costs can be traced back to ancient Rome, where security for costs was 
originally conceived. 
A. Roman Law Origins and the Cautio Judicatum Solvi: Historical 
Background of Security for Court Costs 
While a majority of legal commentators point to early England as the 
birthplace of security for costs,32 its origin is in fact much older.33 Indeed, 
security for costs is rooted in the Roman law concept of cautio judicatum 
solvi34 (Latin for “security that the judgment will be paid”).35 The law 
governing satisdatio, or security in legal actions,36 under Roman rule can 
be restated as follows. In real actions, the possessor, i.e., the defendant, 
                                                                                                             
 26. See LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4522 (2019). 
 27. See McGlynn v. Donahue, No. 2017 CW 0183, 2017 WL 2189806, at *1 
(La. Ct. App. May 18, 2017) (“Neither [Louisiana Revised Statutes § 13:1215 nor 
§ 13:4522] requires the defendant to provide security for costs. The courts of this 
state have rejected arguments that a defendant in a reconventional demand can 
compel the defendant in the principal demand to provide security for costs.”). 
 28. See Ellington, supra note 25, at 191. 
 29. A “vexatious suit” is defined as “[a] lawsuit instituted maliciously and 
without good grounds, meant to create trouble and expense for the party being 
sued.” Vexatious Suit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 30. See Cadili, supra note 19, at 2. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See, e.g., Stephen Colbran, The Origin of Security for Costs, 14 
QUEENSLAND LAW. 44 (1993) (identifying early England as the origin of security 
for court costs). 
 33. See Bernhard Berger, Security for Costs: Trends and Developments in 
Swiss Arbitral Case Law, 28 ASS’N SUISSE DE L’ARBITRAGE BULL. 7, 7 (2010). 
 34. See id. 
 35. Cautio judicatum solvi, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 36. Satisdatio, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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had to give security cautio judicatum solvi.37 Interestingly, this is a stark 
deviation from the current security-for-court-costs scheme, in which only 
the plaintiff or intervenor can be ordered to post security.38 This security 
hinged on three points: (1) that the defendant would pay the sum fixed as 
an alternative on the condemnation for the non-delivery of the thing in 
dispute; (2) that he would appear for sentence; and (3) that he would not 
employ fraud in obeying the judge’s order.39 A plaintiff, however, did not 
have to give security in real actions; nevertheless, if he sued via a 
procurator,40 otherwise known as a mandatary in the civil law or an agent 
in the common law, security was required.41 In personal actions, neither 
the defendant nor the plaintiff were obligated to post security.42 
The evolution and progression of security for costs from the civil law 
to the common law, however, was slow. As one legal commentator noted, 
“It was only by degrees that security for costs made its way into the 
common law.”43 Under early English law, the prevailing party could not 
recover his litigation costs.44 Thus, a defendant faced a predicament: he 
would have to invest time, money, and other valuable resources in 
defending himself against claims, but he could not seek reimbursement for 
those expenses—not even if he was ultimately successful.45 The enactment 
of the Statute of Gloucester46 rectified this inequitable principle in 1278 
by permitting prevailing parties to recover their costs incurred while either 
prosecuting or defending against a claim.47 Unlike the modern American 
                                                                                                             
 37. GORDON CAMPBELL, A COMPENDIUM ON ROMAN LAW FOUNDED ON THE 
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN: TOGETHER WITH EXAMINATION QUESTIONS SET IN THE 
UNIVERSITY AND BAR EXAMINATIONS WITH SOLUTIONS AND DEFINITIONS OF 
LEADING TERMS IN THE WORDS OF THE PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES 147 (1878). See 
also PATRICK CUMIN, A MANUAL OF CIVIL LAW; OR, EXAMINATION IN THE 
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 361–64 (1854). 
 38. See LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4522 (2019). See also infra Part I.B.2. 
 39. CAMPBELL, supra note 37, at 147; CUMIN, supra note 37, at 361–64. 
 40. Under Roman law, a procurator was “[a] person informally appointed to 
represent another in a judicial proceeding.” Procurator, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). 
 41. Id. 
 42. CAMPBELL, supra note 37, at 148. 
 43. Colbran, supra note 32, at 48 (footnote omitted). 
 44. See 4 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 536–37 (3d ed. 
1945) (commenting that the “amercement of the vanquished party was . . . considered 
sufficient punishment” at common law, and, therefore, costs were not necessary). 
 45. Id. 
 46. 6 Edw. 1, c. 1 § 1 (1278), reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 
47 (1993). 
 47. See Gliedman, supra note 3, at 956. 
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rule, the English rule regarding costs and fees allowed the prevailing party 
to recover both ordinary litigation costs and attorney’s fees.48 
Several centuries after the Statute of Gloucester was enacted, security 
for costs became routine practice in English courtrooms.49 By the late 18th 
century, various other European courts required security for costs.50 
American jurisdictions soon followed suit and began requiring security for 
costs in qualified actions.51 Louisiana quickly joined the growing number 
of American states recognizing this procedural device,52 with the earliest 
cases arising in the mid-19th century.53 
B. Synopsis of Louisiana Law: Louisiana Revised Statutes § 13:4522 
As an internationally recognized mechanism originating in ancient 
Rome, Louisiana embraced security for costs and viewed it as a protective 
measure.54 In Louisiana, security for costs is one form of security that may 
be required from a party. In fact, parties are subject to orders for security 
at several stages throughout a suit’s lifespan.55 These stages include 
security for court costs,56 jury costs,57 wrongful issuance of conservatory 
writs,58 and faithful performance of duties as legal representatives.59 
Presently, Louisiana’s security for costs statute is codified in Louisiana 
                                                                                                             
 48. See Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 856 (1929) (“It is 
common understanding in America that the difference between the American and 
the English rules as to costs lies in the fact that under the English system the 
successful party may recover the charges that he has to pay his own lawyer.”). 
 49. See Gliedman, supra note 3, at 957. 
 50. See id. at 956–57 (footnote omitted). 
 51. See, e.g., Shaw v. Wallace, 2 Dall. 179, 179–80 (Pa. 1792) (requiring 
security for costs from a New York plaintiff); McEwen v. Gibbs, 4 Dall. 137, 137 
(Pa. 1794) (requiring security for costs from a “certified bankrupt” plaintiff). 
 52. See cases cited supra note 24. 
 53. See, e.g., Greiner v. Prendergast, 2 Rob. 235 (La. 1842) (ruling that the 
state is dispensed from the requirement of providing security for court costs on 
appeal); Haughton v. Haughton, 11 La. Ann. 200 (La. 1856) (“Much discretion 
must be left to the judge of the first instance in [determining the amount of security 
for court costs], in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the court.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Grinage v. Times-Democrat Publ’g Co., 31 So. 682, 683 (La. 1902). 
 55. FRANK L. MARAIST, CIVIL PROCEDURE - SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, in 1A 
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE § 10.1 (2017 ed.). 
 56. See LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4522 (2019). 
 57. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 1733–34.1 (2019). 
 58. See id. arts. 3501, 3610. 
 59. See id. arts. 3151–53, 4131–37. 
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Revised Statutes § 13:4522. Enacted in 1926, this two-sentence statute is 
entitled “Defendant may demand security for costs” and states: 
The defendant before pleading in all cases may by motion demand 
and require the plaintiff or intervenor to give security for the cost 
in such case, and on failure to do so within the time fixed by the 
court such suit or intervention, as the case may be, shall be 
dismissed without prejudice. This section shall not apply to the 
Parish of Orleans60 and to cases brought in forma pauperis,61 nor 
to the state or any political subdivision thereof.62 
The brevity of the statute should not be mistaken for clarity. Several 
Louisiana courts have grappled with this procedural mechanism.63 
1. The Purpose of Louisiana’s Statutory Scheme 
Almost three decades prior to the enactment of the current statute, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court resolved a challenge to Act No. 136 of 1880, a 
precursor to § 13:4522.64 In Grinage v. Times-Democrat Publishing Co., 
the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the underlying rationale behind 
Louisiana’s statutory scheme for security for costs.65 The court 
acknowledged two intertwined truths: (1) a defendant has a right to defend 
himself when impleaded in the courts; but (2) the defendant, “in many 
cases,” will incur expenses in making that defense.66 Although the primary 
responsibility for the costs of the suit lies with the plaintiff, the court 
recognized the reality that the plaintiff may not be able to bear this 
                                                                                                             
 60. A parallel provision at Louisiana Revised Statutes § 13:1215 allows a 
defendant to require the posting of a cost bond in Civil District Court for the Parish 
of Orleans. Unlike § 13:4522, which contemplates the filing of a motion and a 
contradictory hearing, § 13:1215 provides for the filing of an ex parte motion and 
order. LA. REV. STAT. § 13:1215. 
 61. “Paupers,” or the indigent, are generally “permitted to disregard filing fees 
and court costs.” In Forma Pauperis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 62. LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4522. 
 63. See, e.g., Grinage v. Times-Democrat Publ’g Co., 31 So. 682, 683 (La. 
1902); see also Carter v. Phillips, 337 So. 2d 187, 188 (La. 1976). 
 64. “Section 4 of the act enacts that the defendant . . . shall have the right to 
require the plaintiff to give bond for costs, in such amount as the court may fix, to 
secure repayment, on final determination of the suit, of the costs expended by such 
defendant therein.” Grinage, 31 So. at 683. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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financial burden.67 Thus, “[a] defendant may make large outlays in 
vindicating his position, and may successfully vindicate it, and yet at the 
end of the suit . . . may be unable to recoup his expenditures.”68 Seven 
decades later in Carter v. Phillips,69 the Louisiana Supreme Court again 
generally expounded upon security for costs and § 13:4522: “[I]t secures 
the payment of those expenses incurred by the defendant in defense of the 
suit which may be taxed as court costs and which the plaintiff may finally 
be condemned to pay.”70 This careful balance between an aggrieved 
party’s right to access of the courts and the protection of defendants from 
insolvent plaintiffs or frivolous claims remains relevant today.71 
2. Procedural Particulars of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 13:4522  
Louisiana’s security for costs statute is an infrequently used provision 
that allows a defendant to require a plaintiff or intervenor to post bond for 
security for costs.72 If the plaintiff or intervenor fails to post the ordered 
bond, the suit is dismissed without prejudice.73 Although § 13:4522 states 
that it applies “in all cases,”74 the statute explicitly does not apply in three 
situations: (1) to suits brought in forma pauperis; (2) to suits brought in 
the Parish of Orleans; or (3) where the state or any political subdivision of 
the state is the plaintiff or intervenor.75 Louisiana’s statutory scheme for 
security for court costs has also survived constitutional challenges, which 
challenged the provisions as violative of due process and discriminatory 
against plaintiffs as a class.76 Despite the statutory language that the 
                                                                                                             
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Carter v. Phillips, 337 So. 2d 187 (La. 1976). See discussion infra Part I.B.3. 
 70. Id. at 188. 
 71. See generally Rebecca Love Kourlis et al., Would “loser pays” eliminate 
frivolous lawsuits and defenses?, NEWTALK (Aug. 19, 2008, 9:00 AM), http:// 
newtalk.org/2008/08/would-loser-pays-eliminate-fri.php [https://perma.cc/9C7M 
-B62Z]. 
 72. MAX TOBIAS, JR. ET AL., LA. PRAC. CIV. PRETRIAL § 8:13 (2016). 
 73. See LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4522 (2019). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See TOBIAS, JR. ET AL., supra note 72. 
 76. See, e.g., Michel v. Edmonson, 218 So. 2d 103 (La. Ct. App. 1968) 
(upholding the statute in the face of constitutional challenges); Grinage v. Times-
Democrat Publ’g Co., 31 So. 682, 683 (La. 1902) (“The constitutional declaration 
that the courts shall be open, and every person for injury done him in his rights, 
lands, goods, person or reputation shall have adequate remedy by due process of 
law . . . is not to be understood or construed as taking from the legislature the 
power to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations relative to the costs incurred 
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defendant must bring this motion before pleading,77 the Louisiana 
Supreme Court in Jones v. Williams78 interpreted the statute to allow the 
defendant to demand a bond for costs when the necessity arises.79 The 
court explained that a defendant’s right to seek security for costs is not 
forfeited by entering a plea in the suit.80 Rather, the defendant may demand 
a bond for costs when “the necessity therefor arises.”81 
The statute requires a cost bond82 only for those necessary expenses 
which a defendant may have to pay in advance of a judgment deciding 
who shall pay costs and which the plaintiff may be condemned to pay.83 
Thus, the statute’s scope is narrowly confined to a small collection of 
expenditures.84 Examples of items that may be taxed as court costs include 
the following: fees of expert witnesses; necessary depositions of 
witnesses; and certain notary public fees.85 The statute does not permit a 
cost bond to encompass potential attorney’s fees, pecuniary damages, or 
punitive damages.86 
Although the security usually consists of a surety bond,87 a plaintiff 
has the option of furnishing a cash bond.88 When a surety bond is provided, 
it must be made payable to the clerk of the trial court in which the 
proceeding is pending.89 Although the defendant bears the burden of 
showing the necessity of a bond for costs before the plaintiff or intervenor 
                                                                                                             
in litigation.”); Bize v. Lavradain, 263 So. 3d 584, 592–97 (La. Ct. App. 2018) 
(upholding the statute in the face of constitutional challenges). 
 77. LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4522. 
 78. Jones v. Williams, 184 So. 565 (La. 1938). 
 79. Id. at 567. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. (emphasis added). 
 82. A “cost bond” is defined as “[a] bond given by a litigant to secure the 
payment of court costs.” Cost Bond, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(listed under “bond”). 
 83. Vines v. Vines, 379 So. 2d 1219, 1221 (La. Ct. App. 1980). 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. 
 87. A “performance bond” is defined as “[a] bond given by a surety to ensure 
the timely performance of a contract. . . . The face amount of the bond is typically 
2% of the value of performance, but occasionally as much as 5%.” Performance 
Bond, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). For a brief discussion on the 
distinction between a surety bond and a cash bond, see Emily Beach, Surety Bond 
vs. Cash Bond, ZACKS INV. RES. (May 7, 2018), https://finance.zacks.com/surety-
bond-vs-cash-bond-3462.html [https://perma.cc/HD6T-JBFV]. 
 88. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 5121 (2019). 
 89. See id. 
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may be required to furnish a bond,90 the trial court has wide discretion in 
determining how that showing is made.91 Ultimately, the trial court has 
discretion in setting the amount of the cost bond that the plaintiff must 
post, if any.92 
3. Carter v. Phillips: Louisiana’s Current Framework for Ruling on a 
§ 13:4522 Motion 
Procedurally, the mechanism behind Louisiana’s security for costs 
statute is relatively straightforward.93 Actual application of the statute, 
however, has proven more difficult.94 Louisiana trial courts presently rely 
on a skeletal framework the Louisiana Supreme Court established in 
Carter v. Phillips when ruling on a motion for security for costs (“§ 
13:4522 motion”).95 In Carter, 19-year-old Elsie Carter brought a medical 
malpractice suit for damages of $250,000 against Dr. Phillips and his 
insurer.96 Carter alleged that Dr. Phillips severed her facial nerves during 
oral surgery.97 After Carter furnished a jury bond98 of $1,000, the 
defendants filed a motion for security for costs in the amount of $900 
pursuant to § 13:4522.99 Adjusted for inflation, this equates to 
approximately $4,066 in 2018 dollars.100 The defendants claimed that a 
proper defense of the suit would require them to expend funds on several 
items, particularly expert medical witness testimony and deposition 
fees.101 At a contradictory hearing on the motion—at which no evidence 
                                                                                                             
 90. See Carville v. City of Plaquemine, 303 So. 2d 291, 293 (La. Ct. App. 1973). 
 91. See Carter v. Phillips, 337 So. 2d 187, 188 (La. 1976) (enumerating 
various outlets the trial court can look to when determining whether a defendant 
has made a proper showing under the statute). 
 92. See Carville, 303 So. 2d at 293. 
 93. If the defendant’s motion is granted, the plaintiff must post the ordered 
security within the timeframe the court establishes. Otherwise, the plaintiff’s suit 
is dismissed without prejudice. See LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4522 (2019). 
 94. See, e.g., Carter, 337 So. 2d at 188. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. The scope of this Comment is limited to security for court costs, i.e., cost 
bonds, and does not discuss jury bonds. For a brief discussion on jury bonds, see 
generally BILLIE COLOMBARO ET AL., LA. PRAC. CIV. TRIAL §§ 3:6–3:12 (2017). 
 99. Carter, 337 So. 2d at 188. 
 100.  CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STATS., https://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=900&year1=197601&year2=201812 [https://perma.cc/633 
P-UMV4] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
 101. Carter, 337 So. 2d at 188. 
2019] COMMENT 1187 
 
 
 
was offered either in support or in opposition—the trial court granted the 
motion and ordered Carter to post a $900 bond for court costs.102 If Carter 
did not post the bond, her suit would be dismissed.103 
In annulling the trial court’s cost bond, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
enunciated a very broad net for the trial court to cast when ruling on a § 
13:4522 motion: 
[I]t is within the discretion of the trial judge to determine whether 
the showing required [by § 13:4522] be made by the allegations 
in the motion, supporting affidavits, the arguments of counsel at 
the hearing, introduction of evidence, or in any other manner 
which the trial judge deems appropriate.104 
Thus, Carter seemingly provides Louisiana trial courts a roadmap cut in 
half: although it provides several vehicles for the trip,105 the law remains 
silent as to what roads, highways, or shortcuts are available to reach the 
ultimate destination—that is, to grant or deny the defendant’s motion.106 
Under the Louisiana Supreme Court’s current guidance, trial courts 
have several outlets at their disposal when ruling on a motion for security 
for court costs.107 This framework, however, fails to instruct trial courts as 
to what courts should look for when navigating the allegations in the 
motion, supporting affidavits, arguments of counsel, and other evidence.108 
For example, the framework is silent as to whether the court should 
consider the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, whether the 
defendant is using the motion in an attempt to stifle a genuine claim, or 
whether potential court costs from the action are going to be high because 
of the length and complexity of the litigation.109 
II. COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: A 
GLOBAL APPROACH TO SECURITY FOR COURT COSTS 
Louisiana will benefit from borrowing legal rules from Ontario, 
Ireland, and South Africa that govern security for court costs. These 
                                                                                                             
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 189. 
 105. For example, a trial court can look to the allegations in the motion, 
supporting affidavits, arguments of counsel at a contradictory hearing, and the 
introduction of evidence. See id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See generally id. 
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particular jurisdictions are included for two reasons. First, there is a 
notable amount of scholarship on the topic of security for costs in relation 
to these jurisdictions.110 Second, this scholarship is informed by a 
jurisprudence that touches on each integral part of the security: the 
rationale behind it, the procedural mechanism, and the ultimate impact on 
the longevity of litigation.111 What is notably absent, however, is reference 
to a pure civilian jurisdiction and its respective approach to security for 
costs. Louisiana’s legal system was largely modeled after the French Code 
Napoléon,112 arguably the pièce de résistance of the civilian world.113 
Although security for costs is a common procedure many common law 
systems recognize, the practice has less footing in civil law jurisdictions.114 
Unfortunately, “[g]iven the limited scope and effect of the rules on costs, 
there are no specific provisions in French law regarding security for 
costs.”115 Thus, the inquiry into Louisiana’s civilian counterpart ends 
there. Nevertheless, reference to other international legal systems is 
instructive in formulating an analytical framework for Louisiana courts to 
follow. Although geographically unlike, a convergence of these three 
jurisdictions—Ontario, Ireland, and South Africa—establishes a clear 
                                                                                                             
 110. See, e.g., Cadili, supra note 19; Biehler, supra note 13; Havenga, supra 
note 14. 
 111. See, e.g., Cadili, supra note 19; Biehler, supra note 13; Havenga, supra 
note 14. 
 112. See Robert A. Pascal, Louisiana’s Mixed Legal System, 15 REV. GEN. 
341, 343–44 (1984) (“It is because of this Civil Code . . . that Louisiana can be 
said to have a ‘mixed’ or a ‘bi-legal’ system.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 113. See MICHAEL GALLAGHER, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN MODERN 
EUROPE 77 (4th ed., McGraw-Hill 2005) (“[The Napoleonic Code] was . . . the 
first modern legal code to be adopted with a pan-European scope and it strongly 
influenced the law of many of the countries formed during and after the 
Napoleonic Wars.”). 
 114. Chris Parker et al., A Global Perspective on Availability of Security for 
Costs and Claim in International Arbitration: Mirage or Oasis?, HERBERT SMITH 
FREEHILLS (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/ 
a-global-perspective-on-availability-of-security-for-costs-and-claim-in [https://per 
ma.cc/67UQ-49LF]. 
 115. Tim Portwood, France, in THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REVIEW 155, 164 
(Damian Taylor ed., 2017); see also Michael Bühler & Pierre Heitzmann, France, 
JONES DAY 57 (Oct. 2009), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/ee6ac2d0-
adef-4f9e-8a82-fc3dbfadaf7b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0c4deb70-26ef-
4d77-b5de-0171692d4971/PLC%20Arbitration%20Handbook%20-%20%20Arti  
cel%20MB%20(France.pdf).PDF [https://perma.cc/UK45-72RY] (“There is no 
specific statutory provision addressing security for costs.”). 
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framework for Louisiana courts to follow when ruling on a motion for 
security for court costs.116 
A. Canadian Approach to Security for Court Costs 
Ontario’s system for security for costs is governed by a detailed and 
sophisticated statute, and Louisiana can benefit from borrowing certain 
aspects incorporated therein.117 Canadian civil procedure, including rules 
regulating costs and fees, is largely based on individual province rules.118 
Thus, procedural mechanisms and rules vary depending on the province.119 
Like the U.S. judicial system, Canada has both a federal court and 
provincial courts with separate and distinct rules.120 As one of Canada’s 
13 provinces and territories, Ontario is governed by the Ontario Rules of 
Civil Procedure (“Ontario Rules”).121 Unlike Louisiana’s two-sentence 
statute governing security for costs, the Ontario Rules offer a detailed 
statutory scheme concerning security for costs.122 Particularly, Rule 56.01 
of the Ontario Rules outlines the specific circumstances in which a 
defendant is allowed to bring a motion for security for costs.123 The rule 
provides that a court, upon motion of a defendant or respondent, may order 
security for costs in six circumstances: (1) the plaintiff resides outside 
Ontario; (2) the plaintiff has another proceeding seeking the same relief 
elsewhere; (3) there is an outstanding order against the plaintiff for costs 
that remain unpaid; (4) the plaintiff has insufficient assets in Ontario to 
cover a potential judgment for costs; (5) the suit is frivolous; or (6) a statute 
entitles the defendant to security for costs.124 Thus, a defendant must first 
                                                                                                             
 116. See discussion infra Part II.A (discussing Ontario’s approach), Part II.B 
(discussing Ireland’s approach), and Part II.C (discussing South Africa’s approach). 
 117. See Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, reg. 194 (Can.), under Courts 
of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (Can.). 
 118. H. Patrick Glenn, Costs and Fees in Common Law Canada and Quebec, U. 
MICH. 1, http://www-personal.umich.edu/~purzel/national_reports/Canada.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S2S3-M9H4] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. For a brief introduction to civil procedure in Ontario, see Eric P. Polten 
& Peter Glezel, Civil Procedure in Ontario, POLTEN & ASSOCS. (2014), 
https://www.poltenassociates.com/Civil-Procedure-English-001l.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/BGK7-8KNM]. 
 122. See Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, reg. 194 (Can.), under Courts 
of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (Can.). 
 123. Cadili, supra note 19, at 2. 
 124. Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, reg. 194 (Can.), under Courts of 
Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (Can.).  
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establish that one of these six discrete circumstances is present when 
seeking security for costs.125 
Rules 56.02–56.09 outline the procedural particulars of security for 
costs under the Ontario Rules.126 Several security for costs statutes focus 
on the residency of the plaintiff,127 and Ontario is no different.128 Many 
jurisdictions hinge the inquiry on whether the plaintiff resides in the 
jurisdiction.129 If the plaintiff is a resident within the jurisdiction, then the 
plaintiff—or his assets—is likely more susceptible to the court’s reach.130 
If the plaintiff resides elsewhere, there is an implicit assumption that the 
court and the defendant will face jurisdictional obstacles in securing court 
costs from the plaintiff.131 
Although Ontario residency is one of the factors to be considered, 
satisfying this or any of the other enumerated grounds in Rule 56.01 does 
not necessarily entitle a defendant to security for costs.132 In Zeitoun v. The 
Economical Insurance Group, the Ontario Divisional Court held that Rule 
56.01 is merely a threshold measure.133 Once a defendant satisfies one of 
                                                                                                             
 125. See Cadili, supra note 19, at 2. 
 126. See Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, reg. 194 (Can.), under Courts 
of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (Can.). 
 127. See, e.g., D. ARIZ. R. 54.1(c) (security for costs may be demanded from 
non-resident plaintiffs); D. ME. R. 54.1 (providing that a defendant may request 
security for costs from a non-resident plaintiff); D. MD. ADM. R. 103(4) (a non-
resident plaintiff may be required to post a security for costs); E.D. PA. CIV. R. 
54.1(a) (an order for security for costs may be entered against a non-resident 
plaintiff); see also Fitzgerald v. Whitmore (1786) 99 Eng. Rep. 1140 (K.B.) 
(noting that English residents were required to give security for costs when 
pursuing claims in European countries); Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd. v. 
Triplan Ltd. [1973] QB 609 at 625 (Eng.) (stating that “the plaintiff must be 
ordinarily resident out of the jurisdiction and the [European Union]” for security 
for costs to be ordered). 
 128. See Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, reg. 194 (Can.), under Courts 
of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (Can.). 
 129. See, e.g., id. (listing non-residency as one of six grounds for which a 
plaintiff may be ordered to post security). For a discussion on constitutional issues 
related to this resident vs. non-resident distinction, see Ellington, supra note 25. 
 130. See generally LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 6(A)(1) (establishing the 
“presence theory” of personal jurisdiction), 6(A)(2) (2019) (establishing the 
“domicile theory” of personal jurisdiction).  
 131. Id. Of course, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. noted, “the 
foundation of jurisdiction is physical power.” McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 
91 (1917). 
 132. See Cadili, supra note 19, at 3. 
 133. See id. (quoting Zeitoun v. The Econ. Ins. Grp. (2008), 292 D.L.R. 4th 
313 (Can. Ont. S.C.J. (Div. Ct.)), aff’d 307 D.L.R. 4th 218 (Can. Ont.)). 
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the six categories, the court must then determine whether an order for 
security for costs would be equitable.134 Once this inquiry is triggered, the 
court must consider a number of factors, including “the merits of the claim, 
the financial circumstances of the plaintiff, and the possible effect of . . . 
preventing a bona fide claim from proceeding.”135 Like Louisiana courts, 
Ontario courts retain broad discretion to decide whether to grant or deny a 
motion for security for costs.136 
Once the defendant has made a proper showing by triggering one of 
the enumerated grounds in Rule 56.01, a plaintiff may resist the motion in 
one of two ways: (1) the plaintiff establishes that he has sufficient assets 
in Ontario; or (2) the plaintiff shows that he is indigent and that justice 
weighs against an order for security.137 Although showing sufficient assets 
is generally easy to satisfy,138 an impecuniosity defense requires the 
plaintiff to show that his financial difficulties will result in the suit’s 
dismissal if he is ordered to pay security.139 The plaintiff must also 
demonstrate that his claim is not “plainly devoid of merit.”140 This 
requirement is an easy obstacle to overcome, as the plainly-devoid-of-
merit standard is a very low evidentiary threshold.141 The rationale behind 
allowing impecuniosity as a defense is grounded on fundamental fairness; 
ultimately, justice would not be served if a plaintiff’s suit is stopped in its 
tracks merely because of the plaintiff’s poverty.142 Further, there is an even 
greater potential for fundamental unfairness if the defendant caused the 
plaintiff’s impecuniosity.143 
In sum, the Ontario Rules establish a detailed procedural framework 
for a court to follow when ruling on a motion for security for costs.144 Rule 
56.01 requires a threshold inquiry into whether one of six enumerated 
                                                                                                             
 134. See id.  
 135. DiFilippo v. DiFilippo, 2013 CanLII 5460, ¶ 26 (Can. Ont. S.C.) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 136. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 137. Cadili, supra note 19, at 4. See DiFilippo, 2013 CanLII 5460, ¶ 27. 
 138. For example, a plaintiff corporation could submit its corporate balance 
sheet or an affidavit to establish its amount of assets. 
 139. See Cadili, supra note 19, at 4. 
 140. Id. 
 141. DiFilippo, 2013 CanLII 5460, ¶ 28 (internal citation omitted). 
 142. See Cadili, supra note 19, at 4 (footnote omitted). 
 143. Id. at 5 (footnote omitted). See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing 
situation where the defendant caused the plaintiff’s lack of financial resources). 
 144. See Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, reg. 194 (Can.), under Courts 
of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (Can.). 
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conditions are met.145 Meeting one of the six conditions triggers an 
additional inquiry by the court to determine whether security for costs 
would be just. A plaintiff is sometimes able to resist a security for costs 
motion by demonstrating that he has sufficient assets within the 
jurisdiction or that he is impecunious and his claim is not “plainly devoid 
of merit.”146 If a plaintiff is unable to counter using either of these 
arguments, only then may a court utilize its broad discretion and order 
security for costs.147 
B. Irish Approach to Security for Court Costs 
Across the pond, Irish courts apply a similar security-for-costs 
scheme. Notably, Irish jurisprudence recognizes “special circumstances” 
that may either support or defeat a motion for security for costs.148 The 
authority of an Irish court to consider a motion for security for costs is 
explicitly recognized under Order 29 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 
of 1986.149 As a court rule, Order 29 contains seven subsections and 
focuses heavily on the residence of the plaintiff.150 For security to be 
ordered against an individual plaintiff pursuant to Order 29, two conditions 
must be satisfied: (1) the plaintiff must reside outside of the jurisdiction 
and the European Union; and (2) the defendant must establish a prima 
facie defense to the plaintiff’s claim.151 Even when both these conditions 
are satisfied, however, Irish courts still possess significant discretion and 
may deny a motion for security for costs in special circumstances.152 Such 
“special circumstances” include the following situations: (1) when the 
                                                                                                             
 145. See Cadili, supra note 19, at 3 (quoting Zeitoun v. The Econ. Ins. Grp. 
(2008), 292 D.L.R. 4th 313 (Can. Ont. S.C.J. (Div. Ct.)), aff’d 307 D.L.R. 4th 218 
(Can. Ont.)). 
 146. See DiFilippo v. DiFilippo, 2013 CanLII 5460, ¶ 28 (Can. Ont. S.C.) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 147. Cadili, supra note 19, at 3 (quoting Zeitoun, 292 D.L.R. 4th 313). 
 148. See Biehler, supra note 13, at 176–77. 
 149. Rules of the Superior Courts 1986 (O. 29) (Ir.), http://www.courts.ie/rules 
.nsf/0/7b00be9a0cd3941380256f8e005984ac [https://perma.cc/EN7X-3RZU] (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2019). 
 150. See id.; see also David L. Scannell, The Influence of the General 
Principles of Community Law on Rules of Procedure and Rules of Substance in 
Ireland, 1 JUD. STUD. INST. J. 64, 120 (2001) (“Orders for security for costs have 
traditionally been available only as against plaintiffs resident outside the 
jurisdiction on the basis that, if they were not available, spurious claims could be 
made with impunity and orders for costs could be evaded with facility.”). 
 151. Biehler, supra note 13, at 176–77. 
 152. Id. at 176. 
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plaintiff shows he has sufficient assets within the jurisdiction or the 
European Union; (2) when the plaintiff’s inability to provide security was 
caused by the defendant’s wrong; or (3) when the defendant’s application 
for security for costs is delayed—that is, filed outside of the prescribed 
filing time.153 
Unlike Ontario’s approach to security for costs, Irish jurisprudence 
remains unclear as to whether the plaintiff’s poverty qualifies as a special 
circumstance that would defeat a motion for security for costs.154 Several 
opinions have grappled with this issue.155 In Flynn v. Rivers,156 the court 
noted the plaintiff’s limited financial resources and concluded that an 
order requiring security would be unjust.157 Thus, the order was refused by 
the Flynn court.158 More recent jurisprudence, however, is inconsistent on 
the issue.159 Although the High Court of Ireland in Heaney v. Malocca 
adopted and followed the approach taken in Flynn, the Irish Supreme 
Court reversed course.160 Noting that the Flynn decision had gone too far, 
the Irish Supreme Court held that a defendant is entitled to security for 
costs if the plaintiff resides outside of the jurisdiction, absent any special 
circumstances.161 Additionally, the court did not explicitly adopt the 
theory that the plaintiff’s poverty could constitute such a special 
circumstance.162 
C. South African Approach to Security for Court Costs 
 Although both Ontario and Ireland permit a court to inquire into the 
merits of a claim when deciding whether to order security, South African 
courts take a different approach by disallowing such an inquisition.163 
Prior to 2008, § 13 of the Companies Act 61 of 1974 (“§ 13”), together 
with its predecessor, § 216 of the Companies Act 46 of 1926, provided 
                                                                                                             
 153. Id. at 176–77 (footnotes omitted). 
 154. Id. at 177. 
 155. See Flynn v. Rivers [1951] 86 ILTR 85 (H. Ct.) (Ir.); Heaney v. Malocca 
[1958] IR 111 (SC) (Ir.); Jahwar v. Betta Livestock [2001] 4 IR 42 (H. Ct.) (Ir.). 
 156. Flynn, 86 ILTR 85. 
 157. Biehler, supra note 13, at 177. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Havenga, supra note 14, at 362. 
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South African164 “courts with the power to require an impecunious 
plaintiff company165 to furnish security for costs if there was reason to 
believe that the plaintiff would not be able to pay an adverse costs 
order.”166 The purpose of § 13 was simple: to protect the public from 
bankrupt companies.167 
Similar to Louisiana’s § 13:4522, § 13 grants discretion to the trial 
court when ruling on a motion for security for costs.168 The South African 
law also requires a two-pronged inquiry by the trial court.169 First, the 
defendant must show that there is good reason to believe that the plaintiff, 
if unsuccessful, would be unable to pay a judgment for costs.170 Second, if 
the court is satisfied by the defendant’s showing, it must then exercise its 
discretion in accordance with § 13.171 At this stage, 
[t]he task of the court was considered to be a balancing exercise: 
it weighed, on the one hand, the injustice to the plaintiff if it were 
prevented from pursuing a proper claim by an order for security, 
and, on the other hand, the injustice to the defendant if no security 
were ordered and the defendant later found himself unable to 
recover costs from an unsuccessful plaintiff.172 
This second inquiry is a fact-intensive exercise by the trial court. If the 
court determines that the injustice the plaintiff would suffer overshadows 
the possibility that the defendant may not recover his costs at the end of 
the suit, then no order for security should be made.173 On the contrary, if 
the injustice of preventing the plaintiff’s claim from being pursued is 
                                                                                                             
 164. The Republic of South Africa, much like Louisiana, is a “mixed” legal 
system. See History and Background, SUP. CT. APPEAL S. AFR. (2015), 
http://www.justice.gov.za/sca/historysca.htm [https://perma.cc/4U3V-WRY2]. 
 165. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 13:4522 applies to both juridical (e.g., a 
corporation or partnership) and natural plaintiffs. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 24 
(2019). 
 166. Willem Janse van Rensburg & Clayton Gow, Analysis: Security for Costs, 
S. AFR. INST. CHARTED ACCTS. (Feb. 2015), https://www.accountancysa.org.za/ 
analysis-security-for-costs/ [https://perma.cc/Q G5J-LEFB]. 
 167. Havenga, supra note 14, at 355. 
 168. Id. at 362. 
 169. Id. at 361–62. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 362. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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minimal and the defendant’s injustice of not recovering his costs is 
significant, then security for costs should be ordered.174 
Unlike several other jurisdictions, the South African judiciary does not 
consider the merits of the case when deciding whether to order security.175 
Under this scheme, a court should not inquire into the merits of the 
plaintiff’s claim or express an opinion on the prospects of success.176 
Ultimately, inquiring into the merits of the underlying claim is a 
questionable practice, as the discovery process often has not begun at the 
time a motion for security is filed.177 
III. BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER: CRAFTING AN ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR LOUISIANA COURTS 
The approaches Canadian, Irish, and South African courts take 
regarding security for costs are distinct and equally instructive for other 
jurisdictions. As a mixed legal system, Louisiana enjoys a diversity of both 
cultural and scholarly influences on its legal landscape.178 This 
convergence of influences has catapulted Louisiana’s legal system from 
the ordinary to the unique.179 In this vein, Louisiana courts and the 
Louisiana Legislature should embrace the recognition and incorporation 
of useful jurisprudential standards and legal theories from international 
jurisdictions.180 Louisiana should take a comparative approach and refine 
                                                                                                             
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. (citations omitted). 
 177. Gliedman, supra note 3, at 955. See also discussion infra Part.III.B. 
 178. See Pascal, supra note 112, at 343–44 (“It is because of this Civil Code, 
fundamentally Spanish with some other influences, largely French in 1825 and the 
years immediately following that date, and more recently Anglo-American, that 
Louisiana can be said to have a ‘mixed’ or a ‘bi-legal’ system.”) (footnotes omitted); 
see also John A. Dixon, Jr., Judicial Method in Interpretation of Law in Louisiana, 
42 LA. L. REV. 1661, 1661 (1982) (“Louisiana is now referred to by some observers 
as a mixed jurisdiction influenced by both the common law and the civil law.”) 
(footnote omitted). For a brief discussion on the survival and future of Louisiana’s 
civilian heritage, see generally Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Survival of Civil Law 
in North America: The Case of Louisiana, 84 L. LIBR. J. 171 (1992). 
 179. See John T. Hood, Jr., The History and Development of the Louisiana Civil 
Code, 19 LA. L. REV. 18, 33 (1959) (“[L]ouisiana has developed a legal system of 
its own, and although grounded on civil law, it must be classified as sui generis.”). 
 180. See generally Huey L. Golden, The Conditional Sale in Louisiana 
Jurisprudence: Anatomy of a Synecdoche, 54 LA. L. REV. 359, 360 (“[L]ouisiana 
is a unique legal laboratory in which scholars are able to study the effects of 
borrowing legal rules from other jurisdictions.”). 
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its own scheme for security for court costs to make up for the lack of a 
comprehensive framework. 
Statutorily, the Louisiana Legislature should amend § 13:4522 to form 
a more detailed piece of legislation.181 In particular, Louisiana courts should 
begin with a multifactored approach as the threshold inquiry when ruling on 
a § 13:4522 motion. On the judicial level, Louisiana courts should adopt a 
burden-shifting procedure under a motion for security for court costs. If the 
court is satisfied that one or more of the factors under the newly amended 
statute are met, then the court should shift its inquiry to whether any 
“special” or exigent circumstances exist to either support or defeat a motion. 
At this point, the burden of proof will shift to the plaintiff to defeat a motion 
for security for costs. Finally, a defendant should be required to submit a bill 
of costs alongside a motion for security for costs. 
A. Adopting a Multifactored Approach to Security for Court Costs 
The Louisiana Legislature should amend § 13:4522 and replace it with 
detailed legislation incorporating a multifactored approach to security for 
costs.182 Under this multifactored approach, Louisiana courts should begin 
their analyses of a § 13:4522 motion by determining whether one of six 
discrete factors are present. Based on Ontario’s model, a Louisiana court’s 
inquiry should begin by determining whether the defendant has shown 
that: 
(1) the plaintiff or intervenor is domiciled outside Louisiana; 
(2) the plaintiff or intervenor has another proceeding for the same 
relief pending in Louisiana or elsewhere; 
(3) the defendant has an order against the plaintiff or intervenor 
for costs in the same or another proceeding that remain unpaid in 
whole or in part; 
(4) there is good reason to believe that the plaintiff or intervenor 
has insufficient assets in Louisiana to pay the costs of the 
defendant; 
(5) there is good reason to believe that the action or application is 
frivolous and vexatious and that the plaintiff or intervenor has 
insufficient assets in Louisiana to pay the costs of the defendant; 
or 
                                                                                                             
 181. See infra Appendix A (model statute and the incorporated multifactored 
approach). 
 182. See id. 
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(6) the defendant is entitled to security for costs by law.183 
These six enumerated factors would establish the bounds of a § 
13:4522 motion. Directing a trial court to consider these factors—instead 
of the fairly broad and indeterminate standard under Carter v. Phillips184—
will better contain Louisiana’s system for security for costs. 
By adopting this proposed legislation in place of the current two-
sentence statutory scheme provided in § 13:4522, trial courts will be 
equipped with a straightforward framework from which to rule on a 
security for costs motion. Both plaintiffs and defendants will benefit from 
the advance knowledge of the specific situations that will require security 
for costs. The model legislation also retains a bedrock principle underlying 
security for costs: the protection of defendants against vexatious claims 
and insolvent plaintiffs. 
A multifactored approach presents both benefits and costs. Although 
multifactored approaches to legal issues are common in the courtroom, they 
are not perfect.185 These imperfections are primarily rooted in an approach’s 
design.186 For example, a test or approach may inadvertently include 
redundant factors.187 Such a duplication of factors would inevitably tie up 
judicial resources with no measurable return.188 Some commentators have 
warned of excessive reliance on multifactor tests, which may, in return, 
produce “mechanical jurisprudence.”189 Nevertheless, multifactor tests and 
“checklists” present several distinct advantages. First, “such tests possess 
the potential for mitigating cognitive error by nudging judges toward more 
deliberative processes.”190 Second, “[m]ultifactor tests can help ensure that 
judges consider all relevant factors and can remind them of their 
responsibility to base decisions on more than mere intuition.”191 Thus, 
litigators and Louisiana courts alike will be positioned to benefit from 
adopting a multifactored approach to security for costs. 
                                                                                                             
 183. This proposed legislation is modeled directly after Ontario’s. See Rules 
of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, reg. 194 (Can.), under Courts of Justice Act, 
R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (Can.). 
 184. See Carter v. Phillips, 337 So. 2d 187, 188 (La. 1976). 
 185. Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 
93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 40–41 (2007). 
 186. Id. at 41. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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B. Omitting an Inquiry into the Merits of the Claim 
Although one of the factors enumerated by both domestic and foreign 
jurisprudence permits a trial court to inquire into the underlying merits of 
a claim when deciding a motion for security for costs,192 Louisiana should 
not adopt such a factor. Because of the early stage of the litigation at which 
security for costs is usually requested, it is possible for the record to be 
void of any features that would suggest that the case lacks merit.193 
Federal case law also recognizes the omission of an inquiry into the 
merits of the underlying claim.194 In Jernryd v. Nilsson, an Illinois federal 
district court ruled on a motion for security for costs from multiple 
defendants under the local rules of the court.195 One defendant’s motion 
requested a cost bond of $750,000, but the other defendant’s motion 
requested $50,000.196 The court determined it could not make any factual 
findings about the merits of the case because of the early stage of the 
litigation.197 The court noted that “[a] security bond is not warranted on 
the grounds that the action lacks merit.”198 The Jernryd court’s decision 
recognized the difficulty in determining the potential merits of a case at 
such an early stage in the litigation, and that even if it were able to make 
such a decision, a lack of merit does not necessarily warrant imposition of 
security for costs.199 
The Jernryd outcome was not an isolated occurrence of a court 
disfavoring an early inquisition into the merits of the case. In Atlanta 
Shipping Corp. v. Chemical Bank, the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York granted the defendant’s motion for security for court 
costs and ordered the plaintiff to post a $10,000 bond “as security for 
costs” under “either the state or local rule.”200 The court “perceive[d] a 
high risk that the plaintiff, a debtor in bankruptcy, [would] be unable to 
                                                                                                             
 192. See, e.g., Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 535 F.2d 140, 144 (1st 
Cir. 1976) (listing “likelihood of success on the merits” as one of several factors 
for a trial court to consider). 
 193. Gliedman, supra note 3, at 966. 
 194. See, e.g., Jernryd v. Nilsson, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11985 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 
20, 1988); Atlanta Shipping Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 631 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986), aff’d, 818 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 195. Jernryd, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11985, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 1988). 
 196. Id. at *3. 
 197. Id. at *5–6. 
 198. Id. at *5 (citing River Plate Reinsurance Co. v. Jay-Mar Grp., Ltd., 588 
F. Supp. 23, *27 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)) (emphasis added). 
 199. Id. at *5–6. 
 200. Atlanta Shipping Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 631 F. Supp. 335, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986), aff’d, 818 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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pay the defendant’s costs should the defendant prevail.”201 Additionally, 
the plaintiff, a foreign corporation, had no reachable assets.202 The 
combination of the plaintiff’s status as a debtor in bankruptcy and its lack 
of assets persuaded the court to order the plaintiff to post a bond for 
security for costs.203 Nevertheless, the court noted: “The plaintiff asks us 
to make a preliminary determination on the merits in order to decide 
whether to require costs. At this stage, that determination is neither 
possible nor necessary.”204 Similar to the Jernryd decision, the Atlanta 
Shipping court correctly recognized its inability to make a determination 
on the merits of the claim because of the early stage of the litigation.205 
Both Jernryd and Atlanta Shipping stand for the proposition that the court 
is not in the proper position to effectively critique an undeveloped and 
insufficient record. Furthermore, a court’s inquiry into the merits of a claim at 
a § 13:4522 hearing may have indirect consequences.206 Particularly, the court 
may tacitly convince the plaintiff to drop his claim if the court’s premature 
views on the case are unfavorable.207 This inadvertent consequence could 
occur before a full discovery is even conducted.208 Ultimately, a court’s 
inquisition into the merits of the underlying claim at this early stage of the 
litigation process—prior to formal discovery—“shows that the repercussions 
of the security requirements are quite significant.”209 In light of these 
significant consequences, a Louisiana court should forgo an inquiry into the 
underlying merits of a claim when ruling on a § 13:4522 motion. 
C. Procedural Dance: Burden Shifting and Special Circumstances 
In addition to omitting an inquiry into the merits of the plaintiff’s 
claim, Louisiana courts should adopt a procedural framework akin to that 
of Ontario and Ireland. Although the initial burden should be on the 
defendant to show the necessity for a bond for costs,210 the burden should 
then shift to the plaintiff to establish either: (1) that he has sufficient assets 
in Louisiana; or (2) “that it is impecunious and that an injustice would 
                                                                                                             
 201. Id. at 353. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 353 n.25 (emphasis added). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Gliedman, supra note 3, at 973. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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result if it were not allowed to proceed with its claim.”211 There is currently 
no burden shifting framework under § 13:4522.212 Although the initial 
burden lies with the defendant to show the necessity for security for court 
costs, the law is silent as to what response, if any, should come from the 
plaintiff.213 
In addition to adopting this burden shifting framework, Louisiana 
courts should recognize a number of applicable “special circumstances,” 
which may either prove supportive or fatal to a defendant’s motion for 
security for costs. A number of jurisdictions, including both Ontario and 
Ireland, support this form of inquiry.214 Under the Ontario Rules and 
jurisprudence, for example, a court is encouraged to look to a number of 
factors when exercising its vast discretion in ordering security, including: 
the amount of costs the defendant already incurred; whether the plaintiff 
may attempt to avoid paying a judgment for costs; the conduct of the 
parties during the proceedings; and whether the plaintiff owns sufficient 
assets within the jurisdiction with which to satisfy a judgment for costs.215 
Ontario courts also recognize the potential for injustice where the 
plaintiff’s impoverishment was caused by the defendant; rightly, this weighs 
against ordering security.216 Likewise, where the plaintiff’s inability to 
provide security was caused by the acts or omissions of the defendant, Irish 
courts deem this a special circumstance in favor of denying the defendant’s 
security for costs motion.217 Louisiana courts, too, should recognize this 
situation as a special circumstance. Courts will then be equipped to protect 
plaintiffs in situations in which the defendant’s actions or omissions caused 
a significant pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.218 
D. Requiring a Bill of Costs 
Finally, a defendant should be required to submit a bill of costs219 in 
conjunction with a motion for security for court costs under § 13:4522. 
The purpose of this measure is simple: to force the defendant to itemize 
                                                                                                             
 211. Cadili, supra note 19, at 4. 
 212. See LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4522 (2019). 
 213. See Carville v. City of Plaquemine, 303 So. 2d 291, 293 (La. Ct. App. 1973). 
 214. See discussion supra Part II.A and Part II.B. 
 215. Cadili, supra note 19, at 5. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Biehler, supra note 13. 
 218. For example, a defendant’s alleged failure to perform under the terms of 
a contract or commission of fraud or conversion can involve serious implications 
for a plaintiff’s purse. 
 219. See infra Appendix B (sample bill of costs). 
2019] COMMENT 1201 
 
 
 
the expected costs that may be taxed as court costs at the end of the judicial 
proceeding.220 Requiring a bill of costs is ideal as it provides the trial court 
with an expeditious and clear look into the heart of the motion for security 
for costs.221 Rather than relying on broad and unsupported assertions within 
a defendant’s motion, a bill of costs affords a trial court the opportunity to 
carefully examine whether the amount the defendant requested is justified. 
In fact, a defendant’s failure to show any taxable costs is fatal to a motion 
under § 13:4522.222 The bill of costs requirement also fits squarely within 
the original framework Carter v. Phillips established.223 
 
E. Special Problems Involving Pro Se Litigants: Heeding Judge 
Chatelain’s Concurrence in Clarkston v. Funderburk 
 
Adopting a multifactored approach, requiring a bill of costs, and 
recognizing appropriate burden shifting and special circumstances is 
essential to securing more equitable results under Louisiana’s security for 
court costs statute.224 Nevertheless, unique concerns arise in the context of 
pro se litigants. Particularly, a pro se litigant may qualify to proceed in forma 
pauperis but may not make the required election to do so.225 Thus, a self-
represented indigent may be especially susceptible to an order for security 
for costs and may face the consequence of having his suit dismissed.226 
                                                                                                             
 220. See Bill, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A certified, itemized 
statement of the amount of costs owed by one litigant to another, prepared so that 
the prevailing party may recover the costs from the losing party.”). 
 221. For a brief discussion on the role of the bill of costs in federal practice, 
see Jaret J. Fuente, Preparing a Bill of Costs, A.B.A., http://apps.americanbar 
.org/dch/thedl.cfm?filename=/YL406000/relatedresources/billofcosts.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/7K8A-P24T] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). 
 222. See Whitson v. Am. Ice Co., 113 So. 849, 851 (La. 1927) (annulling a 
trial court’s order for security for costs where defendant failed to show that it “was 
about to incur any expense or liability for fees which might ultimately be taxed as 
costs against the plaintiff”). 
 223. See Carter v. Phillips, 337 So. 2d 187, 188 (La. 1976). 
 224. See LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4522 (2019). 
 225. “A person who wishes to exercise the privilege of proceeding in forma 
pauperis must apply to the court for permission to do so in his or her first pleading, 
or in an ex parte written motion if requested later.” Roger A. Setter, Special 
Provisions for In Forma Pauperis Appeals—Procedure for Invoking Right to 
Proceed In Forma Pauperis, in LA. PRAC. CIV. APP. § 3:87 (2017). 
 226. See LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4522 (failure to post ordered security for costs 
will result in a suit’s dismissal without prejudice). 
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Clarkston v. Funderburk illustrates this situation.227 In that case, 
Aleashia Clarkston was terminated from her position as public school 
teacher with the Iberia Parish School Board.228 Clarkston asserted “that she 
was wrongfully terminated, denied due process as a tenured employee, and 
publicly defamed.”229 The Louisiana Association of Educators assigned 
attorney Ike Funderburk to represent Clarkston in her case against the school 
board, but Clarkston learned approximately 14 months later that he had 
never filed a suit on her behalf.230 Thus, Clarkston’s claims against the 
school board prescribed, and she subsequently brought a legal malpractice 
suit against Funderburk.231 In the malpractice proceeding, Funderburk filed 
a motion for security for court costs pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 
§ 13:4522.232 The cost bond was set at a staggering $10,000.233 Clarkston, a 
pro se litigant, requested a 30-day extension “due to financial hardship,” but 
ultimately failed to post the ordered security.234 The court dismissed 
Clarkston’s suit against her former attorney, and she then appealed the trial 
court’s actions to the Third Circuit.235 
Although the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order for security 
for costs and the suit’s ultimate dismissal,236 Judge David Chatelain wrote 
separately to highlight particular sensitivities involving pro se litigants in 
the context of security for costs. Judge Chatelain noted: 
 
From the outset, as evident in this case, the legislature has 
incorporated legal jargon in La. R.S. 13:4522. In particular, 
the statute is made inapplicable “to cases brought in forma 
pauperis.” Although “in forma pauperis” may be a term of 
art easily understandable within the legal community, the 
same may not be true among the general populace. Alone 
this may be problematic. However, when read in 
conjunction with [Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct] 
Canon 3 it becomes even more so for the trial judge who is 
required to be impartial, but who is permitted “to facilitate 
the abilities of all litigants, including self-represented 
                                                                                                             
 227. Clarkston v. Funderburk, 211 So. 3d 509 (La. Ct. App. 2017). 
 228. Id. at 510. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 511. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
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litigants.” The facts of the present case highlight that 
problem.237 
 
Thus, Judge Chatelain’s concurrence expresses two primary concerns: 
first, the trial court is required to be impartial; and second, self-represented 
litigants may be disadvantaged when dealing with statutes that incorporate 
legal jargon, such as Louisiana Revised Statutes § 13:4522.  
Although Clarkston responded affirmatively to the trial court when 
questioned about whether she understood the gravity of a $10,000 order for 
security for costs, “she opined the bond amount was substantial for her to 
provide.”238 Judge Chatelain noted that “to require the trial judge . . . to have 
explained the term ‘in forma pauperis’ and all that entailed, would have 
caused the trial judge to suggest a defense to the defendant’s motion.”239 
This explanation, Judge Chatelain suggests, “would have placed the trial 
judge in an untenable position, one that Canon 3 guards against.”240 Thus, 
Judge Chatelain recommends several avenues to “ameliorate this seemingly 
growing concern” surrounding pro se litigants in Louisiana.241 Particularly, 
Judge Chatelain points to a number of guides and manuals for the self-
represented litigant. These resources, however, are but the first step. Judge 
Chatelain continues: 
 
Notwithstanding the availability of these resources, it seems 
crucial that the dissemination of such information to the self-
represented litigant from the very inception of litigation is 
essential to further the search for justice and foster the 
impartiality of the trial judge. To do otherwise keeps valuable 
information hidden from the self-represented litigant, thwarts 
justice, and places an undue burden on trial judges.242 
 
Ultimately, Judge Chatelain urges that invaluable resources and information 
be distributed to self-represented litigants. Otherwise, pro se litigants will be 
deprived of justice, while simultaneously straining the resources of trial 
courts. 
                                                                                                             
 237. Id. at 519 (Chatelain, J. concurring). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. Canon 3 of the Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that “[a] 
judge shall perform the duties of office impartially and diligently.” Code of Judicial 
Conduct, LA. SUP. CT. (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.lasc.org/rules/supreme/cjc.asp 
[https://perma.cc/GZ3N-Z3KH]. 
 241. Clarkston, 211 So. 3d at 519 (Chatelain, J., concurring). 
 242. Id. 
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Judge Chatelain’s concurrence highlights some of the problems pro se 
litigants in Louisiana face in the context of security for court costs. Thus, in 
addition to adopting formalities such as a multifactored approach to security 
for costs, requiring a bill of costs, and implementing a burden-shifting 
scheme, Louisiana courts should heed Judge Chatelain’s warnings and 
implement his recommended solutions when working with self-represented 
litigants. 
CONCLUSION 
Although often overlooked by the legal practitioner, a security for costs 
motion is a powerful procedural tool243 that carries serious implications in 
litigation.244 Failure to post ordered security may act as a total bar to the suit.245 
To achieve clarity and equity, the Louisiana Legislature should refine 
Louisiana’s statutory scheme for security for costs by adopting a comparative 
approach to the issue. A convergence of international jurisprudence—
borrowed from Canada, Ireland, and South Africa—yields a clear framework 
for Louisiana courts to follow when ruling on a motion for security for court 
costs.246 Acting as a metaphorical flashlight, this procedural and analytical 
framework illuminates identifiable factors and circumstances for a trial court 
to consider when deciding whether to grant or deny a § 13:4552 motion. Thus, 
rather than confining itself to the four corners of the defendant’s motion, a 
trial court will be equipped to consider factors such as a plaintiff’s domicile, 
assets within the jurisdiction, and the conduct of the parties when ruling on a 
security for costs motion. Louisiana courts should also take notice of 
particular concerns involving pro se litigants, and work to ensure that 
Louisiana’s indigent are not denied access to justice. Implementing these 
changes will continue shielding defendants from frivolous claims, while 
ensuring that courthouse doors remain open in Louisiana. 
 
Bradley C. Guin*  
                                                                                                             
 243. Cadili, supra note 19, at 2. 
 244. See LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4522 (2019) (plaintiff or intervenor’s failure to 
post ordered security will result in dismissal of suit). 
 245. See id. 
 246. See discussion supra Part II. 
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APPENDIX A: MODEL SECURITY FOR COSTS STATUTE 
Below is a model statute regarding security for costs.247 Section A 
establishes an initial six-factor test for determining whether security for 
costs can be ordered from a plaintiff or intervenor. If the defendant is 
successful in showing that one or more of the factors is applicable, then 
the task of the court is to determine whether ordering security for costs 
would be just. Under the Ontarian perspective, “the satisfaction of the 
enumerated categories ‘merely triggers the inquiry’ into whether an order 
for security would be just.”248 At this point, the court considers “a number 
of [other] factors including . . . the financial circumstances of the plaintiff 
and the possible effect of an order for security for costs preventing a bona 
fide claim from proceeding.”249 Unlike the Ontarian perspective, a 
Louisiana court should adhere to the South African approach and not 
consider the merits of the plaintiff or intervenor’s claims. 
The model statute also codifies several bedrock principles underlying 
security for costs. For example, Section B underscores a trial court’s broad 
discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for security for 
costs. Section C also makes clear that a plaintiff or intervenor’s failure to 
post a cost bond will result in the suit’s dismissal without prejudice. 
Further, the model statute retains several aspects currently found in § 
13:4522. Particularly, the statute does not apply in three situations: (1) to 
the Parish of Orleans; (2) to suits brought in forma pauperis; or (3) to the 
state or any political subdivision thereof.250 The model statute does include 
a new provision allowing a court to modify the amount of a cost bond 
where it is necessary. Section D can apply if a plaintiff or intervenor 
changes domicile outside of Louisiana or vice versa, or if the underlying 
reasons justifying an order for security for costs are no longer present. 
  
                                                                                                             
 247. This model statute borrows heavily from Ontario’s rule governing 
security for costs. See Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, reg. 194 (Can.), 
under Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (Can.). 
 248. Cadili, supra note 19, at 3 (citing DiFilippo v. DiFilippo, 2013 CanLII 
5460, ¶ 26 (Can. Ont. S.C.)). 
 249. Id. 
 250. See LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4522 (2019). 
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A. The court, on motion by the defendant in a proceeding, may 
make such order for security for costs as is just where it 
appears that: 
 
(1) the plaintiff or intervenor is domiciled outside 
Louisiana; 
 
(2) the plaintiff or intervenor has another proceeding for 
the same relief pending in Louisiana or elsewhere; 
 
(3) the defendant has an order against the plaintiff or 
intervenor for costs in the same or another proceeding 
that remain unpaid in whole or in part; 
 
(4) there is good reason to believe that the plaintiff or 
intervenor has insufficient assets in Louisiana to pay 
the costs; 
 
(5) there is good reason to believe that the action or 
application is frivolous and vexatious and that the 
plaintiff or intervenor has insufficient assets in 
Louisiana to pay the costs of the defendant; or 
 
(6) the defendant is entitled to security for costs by law. 
 
B. The amount and form of security and the time for paying into 
court or otherwise giving the required security shall be 
determined by the court. 
 
C. Where a plaintiff or intervenor defaults in giving the security 
required by an order, the court, on motion of any party, may 
dismiss the proceeding without prejudice against the 
defendant who obtained the order. 
 
D. The amount of security required by an order for security for 
costs may be increased or decreased at any time for good 
cause shown. 
 
E. This section shall not apply to the Parish of Orleans and to 
cases brought in forma pauperis, nor to the state or any 
political subdivision thereof.  
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLE BILL OF COSTS TO BE ATTACHED TO A MOTION 
FOR SECURITY FOR COSTS251 
 
 
[Caption of Lawsuit] 
 
BILL OF COSTS 
 
Expert Witness Fees 
Expert Witness #1 ($500/hr. x est. 10 hr.)  $5,000.00 
Expert Witness #2 ($450/hr. x est. 3 hr.)  $1,350.00 
 
Deposition Fees 
Deposition of Expert Witness #1   $500.00 
Deposition of Expert Witness #2   $450.00 
Deposition of Lay Witness #1   $375.00 
Deposition of Lay Witness #2   $375.00 
 
Notary Public Fees 
Notarization of documents   $150.00 
           _________________ 
 
Total Expected Costs
   
  $8,050.00 
                                                                                                             
 251. This bill of costs is modeled after a sample document used under 
Ontario’s security for costs rule. See Cadili, supra note 19, at 16. 
